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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 
HOPKINS ) 
) 
Appel lee, ) 
) 





MOTION FOR SUMMARY AFFIRMANCE 
Plaintiff Ann Hopkins has filed an opposition to defendant 
Price Waterhouse's application for a stay pending appeal. She 
files this Motion for Summary Affirmance with her stay opposition 
under this Court's General Rules 7(h) (3) and 7(i). Summary 
disposition is appropriate here because the "merits of this 
appeal are so clear as to make summary affirmance proper." 
Walker v. Washington, 627 F.2d 541, 545 (D.C. Cir.) (~ curiam), 
cert . denied, 449 U.S. 994 (1980). See also Taxpayers Watchdog, 
Inc. v. Stanley, 819 F.2d 294, 297 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (per curiam); 
Ambach v. Bell, 686 F.2d 974, 979 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (per curiam) ; -
United States v. Allen, 408 F.2d 1287, 1288 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (per 
curiam). Y 
In addition , this case has been in the courts, including the 
Supreme Court, for six years. Important issues of Title VII law 
y In accordance with General Rule 7(i), copies of the 
district court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on 
Remand, May 14, 1990 (hereafter Remand Decision), and remedial 
Order, May 25, 1990, are attached at Tabs 1 and 2. 
have been resolved, and the district court has now found that 
Price Waterhouse violated Title VII and has awarded relief to the 
plaintiff. The trial court's determination on liability is 
governed by F.R.Civ.P. 52(a) and is not clearly erroneous, and 
the court's "chosen method of redressing a Title VII violation is 
reviewable under the abuse of discretion standard." Lander v. 
Lujan, 888 F.2d 153, 156 (D.C. Cir. 1989). There was no abuse 
here. 
Ann Hopkins was 34 years old when she joined Price 
Waterhouse in 1978. She was 39 when sexual sterotyping defeated 
her candidacy for partnership in 1983. She is now 46. The 
normal retirement age at Price Waterhouse is 60. It is time for 
this case to be over, so that she may begin finally to rebuild a 
career interrupted by discrimination. 
INTRODUCTION 
Originally filed in July 1984, this case was tried in March 
1985. The principal issue was whether Price Waterhouse violated 
Title VII when it rejected Ann Hopkins' candidacy for partnership 
in the firm -- and instead placed her on "hold" -- in the spring 
of 1983. The district court found that prohibited discrimi-
nation, in the form of sexual sterotyping, had infected the 
decision-making process on Hopkins' candidacy. The court also 
found that defendant had not proved by clear and convincing 
evidence that Hopkins would have been rejected even in the 
absence of bias. The court ruled, however, that Hopkins' 
departure from Price Waterhouse in early 1984 -- after her office 
- 2 -
had failed to renominate her -- was not a constructive discharge 
and hence foreclosed prospective relief, such as an order 
requiring her admission to the firm as a partner. Hopkins v. 
Price Waterhouse, 618 F.Supp. 1109 (D.D.C. 1985). Y 
on appeal, this Court affirmed the district court's finding 
that Price Waterhouse had "permitt[ed) sterotypical attitudes 
towards women to play a significant, though unquantifiable, role 
in its decision not to invite [Hopkins) to become a partner." 
Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 825 F.2d 458, 461 (D.C. Cir. 
1987). The Court also agreed that defendant had not proved by 
clear and convincing evidence that it would have rejected Hopkins 
in a neutral setting and therefore affirmed the district court's 
finding on liability. Id. at 472. 
The Court reversed on relief, however, holding that 
Price Watemouse' s [ 1983 J decision to deny Hopkins 
partnership status, coupled with [her office's) 
failure to renominate her, would have been viewed by 
any reasonable senior manager in her position as a 
career-ending decision. Accordingly, it arrounted to a 
constructive discharge. 
Id. at 473. Given this ruling, the Court remanded the case "for 
the determinatiQn__of - appropriate damages and relief~~" Id. And 
on these relief issues, the Court was unanimous. See 825 F.2-4--~~ 
473 n.1. 
y The trial court observed that back pay -- in an amount 
equal to Hopkins' lost earnings between the date when she would 
have been admitted as a partner absent bias (July 1, 1983) 
through her January 1984 departure -- would ordinarily have been 
available. No evidence on earnings losses had then been 
presented, however, and the court declined to award back pay. 
618 F.Supp. at 1121. 
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Price Waterhouse then sought Supreme Court review of this 
Court's ruling on liability -- but not its holding on relief. 
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 s.ct. 1775, 1781 n.1. The 
Supreme Court agreed that Hopkins had shown that discrimination 
played a significant role in the 1983 decision on her candidacy, 
and that Price Waterhouse could escape liability only by proving 
that she would have been rejected even in the absence of bias. 
The court held, however, that defendant's efforts in this regard 
should be assessed under the preponderance of the evidence 
standard rather than the more stringent clear and convincing 
test. The Court therefore reversed and remanded "on liability," 
id. at 1795, although the plurality observed that "Price 
Waterhouse does not concretely tell us how its proof was 
preponderant even if it was not clear and convincing." Id. at 
1793. 
On remand there were two issues: (1) whether Title VII 
liability had been established -- more specifically (and more 
narrowly), whether Price Waterhouse had proved by a preponderance 
of evidence that Ann Hopkins would have been rejected for 
partnership in the absence of discrimination, and (2) appropriate 
relief, assuming liability. The Supreme Court had supplied the 
proper evidentiary standard for the liability determination and, 
as noted above, this Court had earlier given directions on relief 
that were never appealed and that remain the law of the case. 
See 825 F.2d at 472-73. 
In short, the waters to be navigated on remand were well 
charted -- "[a]ll major legal issues in this matter have already 
- 4 -
,. 
been resolved by prior appeals in this case" (Order denying stay 
pending appeal, June 25, 1990) (Tab 2) -- and the helmsman was an 
able and experienced district judge. It would be surprising to 
find reversible error in such a setting, and there was none. 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT WAS CORRECT, AND SURELY WAS NOT 
CLEARLY ERRONEOUS, IN FINDING PRICE WATERHOUSE LIABLE 
UNDER TITLE VII 
The issue of liability was refined and focused in this Court 
and the Supreme Court, and on remand Judge Gesell correctly 
framed his task and defendant's burden: 
The Court must make a detennination as to whether or 
not, absent sex stereotyping discrimination, Ms. 
Hopkins would still have been denied a partnership at 
the time her carrlidacy first came under consideration 
by the firm. The burden of proof rests squarely on 
Price Waterhouse to establish that it would have 
placed Ms. Hopkins' carrlidacy on hold, rather than 
vote her into the partnership, had it not pennitted 
sex stereotyping to affect its decision-making 
process. 
Remand Decision (Tab 1) at 1. 
The district court and this Court had previously found that 
Price Waterhouse had failed to carry its burden by clear and 
convincing evidence, so on remand the narrow liability issue was 
whether defendant had nevertheless satisfied the less stringent 
preponderance standard. The trial court said no, and under Civil 
Rule 52(a) that finding of fact can be disturbed only if the 
reviewing court forms a firm conviction that a mistake has been 
committed. Guzman v. Pichirilo, 369 U.S. 698 (1962); C.I.R. v. 
Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278 (1960). 
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The Supreme Court has made clear that Rule 52 applies to all 
factual determinations made under Title VII: 
If the district court's account of the evidence is 
plausible in light of the record viewed in its 
entirety, the court of appeals may not reverse it even 
though convinced that had it been sitting" as the trier 
of fact it would have weighed the evidence 
differently. Where there are two pennissible views of 
the evidence, the factfinder's choice between them 
cannot be clearly erroneous. 
Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573-74 (1985). See 
Bishopp v. District of Columbia, 788 F.2d 781, 785-86 (D.C. Cir. 
1986) ("[w]e must, if we are to reverse the district court, have 
reached the conclusion that its finding is ... based on an 
utterly implausible account of the evidence"). 
Judge Gesell's reading of the evidence on the narrow 
liability issue was not "utterly implausible." On the contrary, 
it was quite clearly correct. Specifically, Ann Hopkins was 
rejected for partnership because a number of partners who did not 
know her well criticized her interpersonal skills. The district 
court originally found that these criticisms, while not wholly 
without foundation, were impermissibly tainted by sexual 
stereotyping. Both this Court and the Supreme Court agreed. 
This was not a case, then, in which legitimate and 
illegitimate factors were clearly and identifiably independent of 
one another. If that were so -- if, for example, Price 
Waterhouse had questioned Hopkins' interpersonal skills but had 
also maintained some type of objective requirement that she 
arguabl y did not meet -- then the analysis would be straight-
forward. That is, the firm could have conceded for the sake of 
' 
argument that its assessment of Hopkins' interpersonal skills was 
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substantially infected with discrimination, yet still have 
asserted that she would not have been promoted because she did 
not meet the independent legitimate requirement. The burden 
would have remained on defendant to prove the existence of such 
an independent standard unmet by Hopkins, but it is possible --
at least in principle -- to envision how this burden could have 
been met. 
Indeed, this was the situation in Mt. Healthy City School 
District Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977). There the 
activity protected by the First Amendment -- a telephone call to 
a radio station concerning a teacher appearance policy -- was 
independent of unprotected misconduct (such as making obscene 
gestures to students). Plaintiff proved that his protected 
activity was a "substantial" or "motivating" factor in the 
decision not to rehire him, but the Supreme Court gave the 
defendant school board the opportunity to argue that the same 
decision would have been made based solely on the independent 
misconduct. 429 U.S. at 287. 
In the present case, however, the legitimate and 
illegitimate motivations were inextricably intertwined, and both 
related to plaintiff's interpersonal dealings. Thus the district 
court on remand properly observed that 
Price Waterhouse, having pennitted discriminatory 
comments to be weighed in the hold decision when 
appraising Ms. Hopkins, was required to separate the 
good from the bad. 
Remand Decision at 8. But the court found, following careful 
consideration, that defendant failed in its task: 
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Id. at 10. 
Price Waterhouse has failed to separate out those 
comments tainted by sexism from those free of sexism 
for the purpose of demonstrating that non-
discriminatory factors alone justified the hold 
decision. 
Judge Gesell was blunt about defendant's failure of proof: 
"Price Waterhouse had the burden to prove something; it had to 
persuade the Court. This it has failed to do." 
Id. at 8. 
The trial court's order of July 25, 1990 denying a stay 
pending appeal observes that "(n)o proof was presented on the 
merits following remand." Y That is, Price Waterhouse sought to 
carry its burden on remand by relying exclusively on the record 
made at the 1985 trial. But at that trial defendant never 
conceded -- even for the sake of argument -- that discrimination 
played any role in the decision on Hopkins, so it never sought to 
introduce any evidence (expert or otherwise) specifically aimed 
at showing that the same decision would have been made even 
absent bias. It never tried to separate the good from the bad. 
In short, the proof needed to "unscramble the omelet" was not put 
in at the original trial, and no new evidence came in on 
remand. Small wonder that the district court was unpersuaded. 
See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 s.ct. at 1790, quoting NLRB 
v. Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 403 (1983) 
("'[i]t is fair that [the employer) bear the risk that the 
influence of legal and illegal motives cannot be separated, 
y On remand the parties presented evidence as to remedy, 
but no new proof was taken on liability. 
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because he knowingly created the risk and because the risk was 
created not by innocent activity but by his own wrongdoing'"). 
The key liability finding on remand -- that defendant had 
not proved that it would have rejected Ann Hopkins' candidacy for 
partnership in the absence of discrimination -- was made by an 
able district judge who had lived with the case for years and who 
acted with the benefit of guidance from the Supreme Court. There 
is nothing close to clear error here. The district court 
properly held Price Waterhouse liable for a violation of Title 
VII. _i/ 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT'S CHOICE OF REMEDY CONSTITUTED A 
SOUND EXERCISE OF DISCRETION 
Price Waterhouse failed to prove that it would have rejected 
Hopkins' candidacy absent bias. Hence, as the district court 
ruled, Hopkins "must be deemed to have failed to receive partner-
ship at the time she was held over because of sex discrimination, 
in violation of Title VII." Remand Decision at 11. This 
reasoning is unassailable. The plurality in the Supreme Court 
observed that "[a] court that finds for a plaintiff under this 
standard [i.e., that defendant has not proved that the same 
decision would have been made absent bias] has effectively 
concluded that an illegitimate motive was a 'but-for' cause of 
the employment decision." 109 s.ct. at 1790. Justice O'Connor 
agreed: 
_ii In its stay papers, Price Waterhouse does not even 
suggest that error infected Judg~ Gesell's determination on 
liability. 
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If the employer fails to carry this burden, the 
factfinder is justified in concluding that the 
decision was :ma.de ''because of" consideration of the 
illegitbra.te factor . . . 
Id. at 1804. 
In the present case, then, the district court's finding of 
liability necessarily means that discrimination based on sex was 
the reason plaintiff was placed on hold instead of immediately 
being admitted to partnership in 1983 (as many of her male 
cohorts were). The most natural remedy was for the court to 
order what had been unlawfully denied -- an offer of partnership 
in Price Waterhouse. 21 
A. Constructive Discharge 
Before reaching the question of the contours of the remedy, 
Judge Gesell first considered constructive discharge. He had 
previously ruled that Hopkins' departure from Price Waterhouse in 
January 1984 was not a constructive discharge and thus foreclosed 
prospective relief. This Court, however -- in a section of its 
decision that was unanimous and never appealed -- reversed on the 
constructive discharge issue. 825 F.2d at 472-73. Seep. 3 
above. 
Price Waterhouse argued on remand that Judge Gesell was free 
to ignore this Court's determination, contending that the Court 
had vacated all aspects of its original decision. He disagreed: 
Folla;,.,ing the original trial, this Court concluded 
that Ms. Hopkins was not entitled to partnership or to 
2f As a technical matter, Price Waterhouse employs the term 
"principal" to describe those of , its partners who are management 
consultants. Hopkins is a consultant, so "principal" is used in 
the remedial Order (Tab 2). 
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back pay because she had failed to prove that she was 
constru.ctively discharged. * * * The Court of 
Appeals reversed on this point, holding that Ms. 
Hopkins was constructively discharged when [her 
off ice J decided not to repropose her. * * * As 
Justice Brennan noted, Price Waterhouse did not appeal 
this holding to the SUpreme Court. * * * This Court 
is bound by it. 
Remand Decision at 14 (citations omitted); see generally 11-15. 
Among other things, Judge Gesell observed that 
[a]s a matter of corranon sense and judicial economy, 
the Court of Appeals had no reason to vacate aspects 
of the decision dealing with remedy which were 
analytically unrelated to the decision on liability. 
* * * Here, where there are no new facts or intervening 
authority that would provide a basis for questioning 
crucial unappealed holdings by the Court of Appeals on 
the same factual record, the Court sees no logical 
basis for upsetting them. 
Remand Decision at 12-13. 
Finally, the district court aptly noted that this Court's 
"decision in Hopkins has been repeatedly cited in this Circuit, 
in every case on the precise issue -- constructive discharge --
that Price Waterhouse now wants to avoid." Id. at 13. In sum, 
this Court's holding on constructive discharge is the law of this 
case, Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 618 (1983), and in any 
event is the law of this Circuit. Ann Hopkins, having been 
constructively discharged after she was rejected for partnership 
in violation of Title VII, was entitled to full relief. 
B. The District Court's Authority 
This court recently emphasized that 
[d)istrict courts nrust strive to grant "the most 
complete relief possible" in cases of Title VII 
violations. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 
747, 764 (1976). In particular, the courts nrust make 
the victim "whole" by '"plat:[ing him], as near as may 
be, in the situation he would have cx::cupied if the 
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wrong had not been committed.'" Albemarle Paper Co. 
v. Moody, 422 U.S. at 418-19 (quoting Wicker v. 
Hoppock, 6 Wall 94, 99 (1867)). 
Lander v. Lujan, 888 F.2d. 153, 156 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
Since plaintiff was denied admission to a partnership because of 
prohibited discrimination, "the most complete relief possible" 
would include an order requiring that partnership be offered to 
her. 
There is no question that the district court had authority 
to direct defendant to admit Hopkins to partnership. That issue 
was effectively decided in Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69 
(1984), which the Supreme Court in the present case cited in 
noting that "[d]ecisions pertaining to advancement to partnership 
are, of course, subject to challenge under Title VII." 109 s.ct. 
at 1781 n.l. Y In Hishon the Court expressly rejected the 
contention that applying Title VII to decisions on partnership 
admission would impinge on associational freedom. 467 U.S. at 
77-78. This discussion has resonance precisely because of the 
possibility that a partnership might be required -- over 
objection -- to admit someone to its ranks. Here, moreover, 
Price Waterhouse is a nationwide firm of over 900 partners, "so 
concerns about freedom of association have little force." Remand 
Decision at 18. 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected contentions about 
freedom of association even when made by nonprofit organizations 
y As the Supreme Court understood, this case deals only 
with advancement to partnership. , Hence defendant misses the mark 
by citing cases that question whether Title VII applies to 
disputes among partners. See defendant's stay motion at 11-12. 
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that were established for social and community betterment 
purposes, when their size and business-related features brought 
them within the regulatory ambit of state and local anti-
discrimination laws. New York State Club Association v. City of 
New York, 108 s.ct. 2225 (1988); Board of Directors of Rotary 
International v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 107 s.ct. 1940 (1987); 
Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1987). In 
Roberts, the Court pointedly contrasted the intimacy, personal 
attachment and selectivity of family relationships with "an 
association lacking these qualities -- such as a large business 
enterprise," noting that the latter type of organization "seems 
remote from the concerns giving rise to the constitutional 
protection of expressive association." 468 U.S. at 620. 
Earlier this year, the Supreme Court again forcefully 
rejected the idea that partnerships enjoy special status under 
Title VII. In University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 110 s.ct. 577 
(1990), the Court held that peer review materials related to 
university tenure decisions are not privileged and are subject to 
normal discovery rules. Among other things, the Court reasoned 
that 
[a]cceptance of petitioner's claim would also lead to 
a wave of similar privilege claims by other employers 
who play significant roles in furthering speech arrl 
learning in society. What of writers, publishers, 
ItnlSicians, lawyers? It surely is not unreasonable to 
believe, for exanple, that confidential peer reviews 
play an inportant part in partnership determinations 
at some law finns. 
Id. at 585. 
In University of Pennsylvan~a v. EEOC; as in Hishon, the 
Supreme Court looked to see whether Congress had intended to 
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grant the claimed exception. Finding no such intention, the 
Court refused to tailor the requirements of Title VII to the 
preferences of particular categories of employers. And just last 
week, the Court declined to review the First Circuit's approval 
of an order requiring a university to award tenure to a 
successful Title VII plaintiff. Brown v. Trustees of Boston 
University, 891 F.2d 337 (1st Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 58 
U.S.L.W. 3796 (June 18, 1990). First Amendment concerns are 
present to a greater degree in the academic setting than in a 
far-flung business enterprise, but even in academia full relief 
is required for violations of Title VII. 
If tenure is a sensitive area, appointment to unique 
positions in the upper reaches of the Executive Branch is even 
more so. Yet in Lander v. Lujan, 888 F.2d at 153, this Court 
affirmed an order requiring that the plaintiff be placed in just 
such a position, the senior civil service job in his agency. The 
order in Lander was extraordinary, moreover, in requiring the 
"bumping" of an innocent employee, but this Court held that 
bumping was permissible if needed to accord make-whole relief to 
the plaintiff. In the present case, of course, no incumbent 
partners will lose their status when Hopkins is admitted; 
partnership in Price Waterhouse is open-ended and is granted to 
40 or more candidates every year. 
The lesson that emerges from these decisions is clear: 
courts will do what is needed to provide complete relief to those 
subjected to violations of Title VII. Their powers are fully 
adequate to that basic purpose and are to be used to achieve 
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it. In this regard, it is also relevant that this Court, when it 
first considered this case, indicated at three different points 
in its opinion that it viewed an offer of partnership as the 
appropriate prospective relief and assumed that the district 
court would have ordered such relief if it had found constructive 
discharge. 2/ 
C. The District Court's Sound Exercise of Discretion 
Judge Gesell had the authority to require Price Waterhouse 
to admit Ann Hopkins to partnership. This was a discretionary 
decision, and he exercised his discretion carefully, 
conscientiously and correctly -- and in furtherance of Title 
VII's twin remedial objectives of eradicating discrimination and 
making victims whole. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 
405, 421 (1975). There was no abuse of discretion here. 
Ann Hopkins was denied admission to the firm because of her 
sex in violation of Title VII. The law requires full relief to 
J_J See 825 F.2d at 464: "Having concluded that Hopkins was a 
victim of sexual discrimination, the trial judge went on to find 
that she was nevertheless not entitled to an order directing the 
firm to make her a partner." 
Id. at 464-65: "Accordingly, the [trial] court denied her 
both backpay from the date of her resignation and a decree 
requiring that she be invited to join Price Waterhouse as a 
partner." 
Id. at 472: "With respect to post[r]esignation damages, the 
District Court found that Hopkins had failed to demonstrate that 
she had been constructively discharged and therefore was 
ineligible both for backpay subsequent to the date of her 
resignation and an order directing that she be made a partner." 
Emphasis supplied. As noted above, the dissent observed that 
"[t]he majority's treatment of the relief issues ... seems 
correct." 825 F.2d at 473 n.1. 
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Title VII victims. Given this, Judge Gesell reasoned that 
ordering Price Waterhouse to make Ms. Hopkins a 
partner would appear to be the appropriate remedy 
unless some factor makes such an order inequitable or 
otherwise inappropriate. 'Ihe Court finds that no 
significant factor of this kind exists. 
Remand Decision at 17. 
Judge Gesell was quite familiar with the players here. He 
recognized that "extreme workplace hostility" may counsel against 
reinstatement, but he found that "this is not such a case." 
Id. The plain fact is that Price Waterhouse just doesn't want to 
admit Ann Hopkins as a partner but, as this Court had held and 
Judge Gesell heeded, "[a] district court's discrimination remedy 
cannot turn on the employer's preferences." Lander v. Lujan, 888 
F.2d at 158. See Remedy Decision at 17. 
The district court carefully weighed several other arguments 
made by Price Waterhouse. The court concluded that associational 
freedom was not a real issue; that Hopkins would not initially be 
exercising significant influence within the firm, so that 
partnership would mean only that she would get increased economic 
opportunity; and that she had the "necessary skills" to be a 
partner in her area of expertise. Id. at 18. These findings are 
not subject to challenge. 
The court also considered and rejected defendant's proposal 
that the selection process just be rerun on a nondiscriminatory 
basis: 
Ordering Price Waterhouse to simply reconsider Ms. 
Hopkins for partnership would be futile arrl unjust, 
because the testimony of Price Waterhouse's chainnan 
at the relief trial suggested that the deck is stacked 
against her. Price Waterhollse plainly does not want 
her arrl would not voluntarily admit her. Partnership, 
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not sin,ply a new vote, is the logical remedy, given 
the finding that Ms. Hopkins was likely to have been 
made a partner if not for unlawful discrimination. 
Remand Decision at 19. Y 
Finally, Judge Gesell considered the possibility of front 
pay in lieu of actual admission to partnership but reasoned that 
it might not make her whole or, conversely, could provide an 
unwarranted windfall. Moreover, the court was "skeptical as to 
whether monetary relief alone provides a sufficient deterrent 
against future discrimination for a group of highly-paid 
partners." Remedy Decision at 19. 
In sum, Judge Gesell considered all pertinent factors with 
an eye toward vindicating the national policy embodied in Title 
VII. His choice of remedy -- that Price Waterhouse be required 
to admit Ann Hopkins into the partnership -- constituted a sound 
exercise of discretion and should not be reversed. Lander v. 
Lujan, 888 F.2d at 156. 
In the absence of discrimination, Hopkins would have been 
admitted to the firm on July 1, 1983. Under the district court's 
remedial order she will be admitted effective July 1, 1990. 
Hopkins sought some $680,000 in back compensation for this 
period. The court gave Price Waterhouse the benefit of the doubt 
on several mitigation issues, however, and ultimately awarded 
$371,175. Defendant can hardly complain about this. 
y The First Circuit in Brown v. Trustees of Boston 
University, 891 F.2d at 360, also rejected the notion that full 
relief under Title VII could be achieved simply by rerunning the 
decision-making process. 
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CONCLUSION 
This is a well traveled case. As a consequence, the issues 
on appeal are exceedingly narrow -- whether Judge Gesell 
committed clear error in determining that Price Waterhouse did 
not carry its burden of proof on remand and hence did not avoid 
liability, and whether he abused his discretion in directing Ann 
Hopkins' admission to the firm. In its stay papers, Price 
Waterhouse has not even suggested the possibility of error on 
liability, and its arguments on remedy are ill-founded. 
In its stay papers, as in the Supreme Court and earlier in 
this Court, Price Waterhouse does its best to paint an 
unflattering portrait of Hopkins and asks plaintively how the 
firm can be forced to accept her. But the district court, 
following instructions from the Supreme Court, has found that the 
true reason for Hopkins' failure to become a partner in 1983 was 
her sex. This finding of liability -- which Price Waterhouse 
cannot hope to challenge -- triggers full relief. Judge Gesell 
understood this, and he approached the issue of remedy with 
sensitivity, mindful both of the facts of this case and the 
imperatives of the law. 
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The district court's decision and remedial order should be 
summarily affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
KA R, SCOTT & HELLER 
1275 K Street, N.W. 
Suite 950 
Washington, D.C. 20005 
Attorneys for Appellee 
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